FXRP Trove branch
PriceFeed 0xFc35d431Ce1445B9c79ff38594EF454618D2Ec49 -> PriceFeedFtsoV2Connector implementation 0x68aa9aa27cfa5f4fa71b22e614efe408281e1295 -> hard-coded FlareContractRegistry 0xaD67FE66660Fb8dFE9d6b1b4240d8650e30F6019 -> resolved FTSOv2 0x7BDE3Df0624114eDB3A67dFe6753e62f4e7c1d20 -> XRP/USD feed 0x015852502f55534400000000000000000000000000 · Flare FTSOv2 · flare
FXRP · MCR 110% · shutdown CR 105% · AddressesRegistry 0x65C378Bf4A68491436C84d8Da020b14FEfE03D17; TroveManager 0xc46e7d0538494FEb82b460b9723dAba0508C8Fb1; BorrowerOperations 0x18139E09Fb9a683Dd2c2df5D0edAD942c19CE912; CCR 150%; Stability Pool penalty 5%; redistribution penalty 10%; fixed-block reads showed active troves, nonzero debt, and shutdownTime zero.
Any caller can immediately liquidate under-MCR troves; no auction or keeper allowlist applies. The branch Stability Pool offsets at most its deposits minus MIN_BOLD_IN_SP (1e18), preserving that minimum, and any remaining debt and collateral are redistributed to active troves. · liquidation delay None
Branch Stability Pool 0x2c817F7159c08d94f09764086330c96Bb3265A2f offsets debt only from deposits above MIN_BOLD_IN_SP (1e18), which is preserved; uncovered debt and collateral are redistributed across surviving FXRP troves. No committed external insurance or auction capital exists.
PriceFeedFtsoV2Connector resolves FTSOv2 through the hard-coded FlareContractRegistry, calls the single configured feed, discards its timestamp, and enforces no maximum age. Successful reads return oracleFailureDetected=false. Registry or FTSO failure reverts before a boolean is returned, so branch shutdown is not activated; there is no cache or alternate source. The Safe owner can replace the feed ID immediately, but this is admin reconfiguration rather than automatic failover.
Anyone can shut the branch when TCR falls below the 105% SCR; shutdown blocks new borrowing while urgent redemption and debt resolution continue. Successful connector calls return oracleFailureDetected=false; registry or FTSO failures revert before that flag can trigger shutdown. Unoffset liquidation debt is redistributed and no separate residual-debt cure is committed.
wFLR Trove branch
PriceFeed 0xBCB5420d7F6346DB739a7C49FC90AB37553B68dc -> PriceFeedFtsoV2Connector implementation 0x68aa9aa27cfa5f4fa71b22e614efe408281e1295 -> hard-coded FlareContractRegistry 0xaD67FE66660Fb8dFE9d6b1b4240d8650e30F6019 -> resolved FTSOv2 0x7BDE3Df0624114eDB3A67dFe6753e62f4e7c1d20 -> FLR/USD feed 0x01464c522f55534400000000000000000000000000 · Flare FTSOv2 · flare
wFLR · MCR 120% · shutdown CR 110% · AddressesRegistry 0xE4Fc0543990128612d8112c90cdECc252165D255; TroveManager 0xB6cB0c5301D4E6e227Ba490cee7b92EB954ac06D; BorrowerOperations 0x19b154D5d20126a77309ae01931645a135E4E252; CCR 160%; Stability Pool penalty 5%; redistribution penalty 20%; fixed-block reads showed active troves, nonzero debt, and shutdownTime zero.
Any caller can immediately liquidate under-MCR troves; no auction or keeper allowlist applies. The branch Stability Pool offsets at most its deposits minus MIN_BOLD_IN_SP (1e18), preserving that minimum, and any remaining debt and collateral are redistributed to active troves. · liquidation delay None
Branch Stability Pool 0x0Dd6daab4cB9A0ba6707Cf59DBfbc28cc33CA24A offsets debt only from deposits above MIN_BOLD_IN_SP (1e18), which is preserved; uncovered debt and collateral are redistributed across surviving wFLR troves. No committed external insurance or auction capital exists.
PriceFeedFtsoV2Connector resolves FTSOv2 through the hard-coded FlareContractRegistry, calls the single configured feed, discards its timestamp, and enforces no maximum age. Successful reads return oracleFailureDetected=false. Registry or FTSO failure reverts before a boolean is returned, so branch shutdown is not activated; there is no cache or alternate source. The Safe owner can replace the feed ID immediately, but this is admin reconfiguration rather than automatic failover.
Anyone can shut the branch when TCR falls below the 110% SCR; shutdown blocks new borrowing while urgent redemption and debt resolution continue. Successful connector calls return oracleFailureDetected=false; registry or FTSO failures revert before that flag can trigger shutdown. Unoffset liquidation debt is redistributed and no separate residual-debt cure is committed.
stXRP Trove branch
PriceFeed 0x030Cfe7bed11e0CBa106b4c5ffF8edAe793653A7 -> PriceFeedFtsoV2Connector implementation 0x68aa9aa27cfa5f4fa71b22e614efe408281e1295 -> hard-coded FlareContractRegistry 0xaD67FE66660Fb8dFE9d6b1b4240d8650e30F6019 -> resolved FTSOv2 0x7BDE3Df0624114eDB3A67dFe6753e62f4e7c1d20 -> custom stXRP/USD feed 0x2173745852502f5553440000000000000000000000 · Flare FTSOv2 custom feed · flare
stXRP · MCR 160% · shutdown CR 110% · AddressesRegistry 0x6988515B4e69Ab8AfA56E6079A1787F5A0a71Be7; TroveManager 0x3866D5EA3c04a1371D8c6F75529064455EB43220; BorrowerOperations 0x46a17394A4CA1d8134278F4397DF9E942B55acE9; CCR 175%; Stability Pool penalty 5%; redistribution penalty 10%; fixed-block reads showed active troves, nonzero debt, and shutdownTime zero.
Any caller can immediately liquidate under-MCR troves; no auction or keeper allowlist applies. The branch Stability Pool offsets at most its deposits minus MIN_BOLD_IN_SP (1e18), preserving that minimum, and any remaining debt and collateral are redistributed to active troves. · liquidation delay None
Branch Stability Pool 0x3FAEC256DCFDB9eBa882b5F71e020FA128081f56 offsets debt only from deposits above MIN_BOLD_IN_SP (1e18), which is preserved; uncovered debt and collateral are redistributed across surviving stXRP troves. No committed external insurance or auction capital exists.
PriceFeedFtsoV2Connector resolves FTSOv2 through the hard-coded FlareContractRegistry, calls the single configured custom feed, discards its timestamp, and enforces no maximum age. Successful reads return oracleFailureDetected=false. Registry or FTSO failure reverts before a boolean is returned, so branch shutdown is not activated; there is no cache or alternate source. The EOA owner can replace the feed ID immediately, but this is admin reconfiguration rather than automatic failover.
Anyone can shut the branch when TCR falls below the 110% SCR; shutdown blocks new borrowing while urgent redemption and debt resolution continue. Successful connector calls return oracleFailureDetected=false; registry or FTSO failures revert before that flag can trigger shutdown. Unoffset liquidation debt is redistributed and no separate residual-debt cure is committed.
sFLR Trove branch
PriceFeed 0x051699d88Ab204C4C848E89a1B439d4D9887460E -> PriceFeedFtsoV2Connector implementation 0x68aa9aa27cfa5f4fa71b22e614efe408281e1295 -> hard-coded FlareContractRegistry 0xaD67FE66660Fb8dFE9d6b1b4240d8650e30F6019 -> resolved FTSOv2 0x7BDE3Df0624114eDB3A67dFe6753e62f4e7c1d20 -> custom sFLR/USD feed 0x2173464c522f555344000000000000000000000000 · Flare FTSOv2 custom feed · flare
sFLR · MCR 125% · shutdown CR 110% · AddressesRegistry 0x8fc9996d9B7c88F84e21fCCf46397cE534A2B17b; TroveManager 0xB7997eCdcE5dB9036c54e128d9eFbcDCdC7c9303; BorrowerOperations 0xa7EfE34FF583dd52d9d6e24e5Eb2aD38d63d0A8f; CCR 160%; Stability Pool penalty 5%; redistribution penalty 10%; fixed-block reads showed active troves, nonzero debt, and shutdownTime zero.
Any caller can immediately liquidate under-MCR troves; no auction or keeper allowlist applies. The branch Stability Pool offsets at most its deposits minus MIN_BOLD_IN_SP (1e18), preserving that minimum, and any remaining debt and collateral are redistributed to active troves. · liquidation delay None
Branch Stability Pool 0xE6B23B97A9058B88e6d068d57d8a69Fb07ab2A61 offsets debt only from deposits above MIN_BOLD_IN_SP (1e18), which is preserved; uncovered debt and collateral are redistributed across surviving sFLR troves. No committed external insurance or auction capital exists.
PriceFeedFtsoV2Connector resolves FTSOv2 through the hard-coded FlareContractRegistry, calls the single configured custom feed, discards its timestamp, and enforces no maximum age. Successful reads return oracleFailureDetected=false. Registry or FTSO failure reverts before a boolean is returned, so branch shutdown is not activated; there is no cache or alternate source. The EOA owner can replace the feed ID immediately, but this is admin reconfiguration rather than automatic failover.
Anyone can shut the branch when TCR falls below the 110% SCR; shutdown blocks new borrowing while urgent redemption and debt resolution continue. Successful connector calls return oracleFailureDetected=false; registry or FTSO failures revert before that flag can trigger shutdown. Unoffset liquidation debt is redistributed and no separate residual-debt cure is committed.
