Feeds
- 15-minute delayed storage with priceLife=3600; implementation 0x839864c09b6e1f04914d009b35a60ea4a66ca6d0 · Fathom CentralizedOraclePriceFeed · XDC Network · 1h staleness bound
- Implementation 0x4ecd5ab25d9b7a93e56d3bb4f9a179d77958bba7 -> XDC/USD aggregator 0x8d470BDE66eE52981D7D29Bc2e6FCa3b4DC17879 · FathomPriceOracle · XDC Network
- Sole reporter 0x7ee0d8c9a1374e3d5ce33d48cd09578251af708f -> latestRoundData; upstream implementation 0x38634a4a034ce3b3289a2be8fe4f348f5fff385a is unverified · Fathom configured single-node aggregator · XDC Network · read by 2 branches
- 15-minute delayed storage with priceLife=3600; implementation 0x15f0998edc963bc8cfe17ca296d4693cc3a5e4ec · Fathom CentralizedOraclePriceFeed · XDC Network · 1h staleness bound
- Implementation 0x50bcaf3f1a3eab320d09471cb7c1f6eca1eb31dc -> CGO/USD aggregator 0x90473A2Fa1d9eb8fe6c45072D933218f828AF834 · FathomPriceOracle · XDC Network
- Same delayed-feed implementation and XDC/USD FathomPriceOracle as WXDC; no psXDC/XDC exchange-rate feed · Fathom CentralizedOraclePriceFeed · XDC Network · 1h staleness bound
- Shared WXDC path: implementation 0x4ecd5ab25d9b7a93e56d3bb4f9a179d77958bba7 -> XDC/USD aggregator 0x8d470BDE66eE52981D7D29Bc2e6FCa3b4DC17879 · FathomPriceOracle · XDC Network
WXDC collateral
Wrapped XDC (WXDC) · max LTV 75.19% · MCR 133% · 25% close factor; 5% gross collateral incentive; 80% of the incentive portion is directed to SystemDebtEngine.
Whitelisted callers can immediately execute fixed-spread liquidation when a position is unsafe. The liquidator pays FXD, receives seized WXDC at the configured incentive, and residual uncovered debt is confiscated to SystemDebtEngine. · liquidation delay None
Liquidation depends on whitelisted external liquidators. Protocol fee and liquidation surplus held by SystemDebtEngine can settle recorded system bad debt, but there is no committed Stability Pool or insurance reserve. At the observed block, 423,345.826467397288 FXD-equivalent surplus exceeded 322,052.371253126181 FXD-equivalent recorded bad debt; that point-in-time coverage is not guaranteed.
There is no secondary feed. A failed upstream retrieval is caught and the stored delayed value remains usable until its upstream timestamp exceeds 3,600 seconds; then isPriceOk is false, liquidation is blocked, and PriceOracle updates can set the safety price to zero. readPrice itself continues returning the stored value.
Owner-only shutdown permanently cages core modules. Each pool must be caged using a healthy delayed feed; positions are processed into collateral claims and system bad debt. After a configured one-to-thirteen-week cooldown, finalized FXD claims redeem pro rata against remaining collateral, while SystemDebtEngine settles the minimum of available surplus and bad debt.
CGO collateral
Comtech Gold (CGO) · max LTV 85.03% · MCR 117.6% · 15% close factor; 5% gross collateral incentive; 80% of the incentive portion is directed to SystemDebtEngine.
Whitelisted callers can immediately execute fixed-spread liquidation when a position is unsafe. The liquidator pays FXD, receives seized CGO at the configured incentive, and residual uncovered debt is confiscated to SystemDebtEngine. · liquidation delay None
Liquidation depends on whitelisted external liquidators. Protocol fee and liquidation surplus held by SystemDebtEngine can settle recorded system bad debt, but there is no committed Stability Pool or insurance reserve. Point-in-time surplus coverage at the observed block is not guaranteed.
There is no secondary feed. Failed upstream retrieval retains the delayed value until its upstream timestamp exceeds 3,600 seconds; after that the feed is invalid for liquidation and safety-price updates can write zero, although readPrice still returns stored data.
Owner-only shutdown permanently cages core modules. Each pool must be caged using a healthy delayed feed; positions are processed into collateral claims and system bad debt. After a configured one-to-thirteen-week cooldown, finalized FXD claims redeem pro rata against remaining collateral, while SystemDebtEngine settles the minimum of available surplus and bad debt.
psXDC collateral
PrimeStakedXDC (psXDC) · max LTV 50% · MCR 200% · 25% close factor; 5% gross collateral incentive; 80% of the incentive portion is directed to SystemDebtEngine.
Whitelisted callers can immediately execute fixed-spread liquidation when a position is unsafe. The liquidator pays FXD, receives seized psXDC at the configured incentive, and residual uncovered debt is confiscated to SystemDebtEngine. · liquidation delay None
Liquidation depends on whitelisted external liquidators. Protocol fee and liquidation surplus held by SystemDebtEngine can settle recorded system bad debt, but there is no committed Stability Pool or insurance reserve. Point-in-time surplus coverage at the observed block is not guaranteed.
There is no secondary feed or psXDC exchange-rate path. The pool inherits the XDC delayed-value behavior: stale data blocks liquidation and can zero the safety price, while readPrice still exposes the stored value.
Owner-only shutdown permanently cages core modules. Each pool must be caged using a healthy delayed feed; positions are processed into collateral claims and system bad debt. After a configured one-to-thirteen-week cooldown, finalized FXD claims redeem pro rata against remaining collateral, while SystemDebtEngine settles the minimum of available surplus and bad debt.
