Feeds
- ProxyOracle 0xa8fA2460927332eD475364c602d916FBC095b1b4 -> oracleImplementation 0x6cc0cd7D25E291029B55C767B9A2D1d9A18Ae668, whose name() resolves to "Chainlink"; the implementation composes yvWETH's Yearn share price against an ETH/USD Chainlink aggregator passed via calldata (getDataParameter), so the exact aggregator address is not separately resolved on-chain in this review · Chainlink (via Abracadabra ProxyOracle) · Ethereum
- ProxyOracle 0x6C86AdB5696d2632973109a337a50EF7bdc48fF1 -> oracleImplementation 0x02dCc3AaA2f0C97Fe0AbFaf07dF3E0c7ae56557A -> ETHUSD() resolves to Chainlink aggregator 0x5f4eC3Df9cbd43714FE2740f5E3616155c5b8419 · Chainlink ETH/USD (via Abracadabra ProxyOracle) · Ethereum
- ProxyOracle 0xacaB7f05A612690B9e05CA3bfC1FF2E99169a39F -> oracleImplementation 0x750E9887425F9f325504Fe69B7173a4cacD55351 -> BTCUSD() resolves to Chainlink aggregator 0xF4030086522a5bEEa4988F8cA5B36dbC97BeE88c · Chainlink BTC/USD (via Abracadabra ProxyOracle) · Ethereum
- ProxyOracle 0x39DBa7955cEE12578B7548dF7eBf88F835d51bE1 -> oracleImplementation 0xaB137bb12e93fEdB8B639771c4C4fE29aC138Ee6, whose YVDAI() getter resolves to the yvDAI vault token itself (0xdA816459F1AB5631232FE5e97a05BBBb94970c95); price is derived from the vault's own share-price accounting with DAI valued at a hardcoded $1 — no Chainlink or other external DAI/USD aggregator is referenced anywhere in the read path · Abracadabra internal vault-share oracle (no external DAI/USD reference) · Ethereum
yvWETH collateral (Cauldron 0xed510639E1b07c9145CD570F8Dd0CA885F760E09)
yvWETH (Yearn WETH vault shares) · max LTV 80% · MCR 125% · COLLATERIZATION_RATE=80000, LIQUIDATION_MULTIPLIER=107500 (7.5% liquidation incentive), BORROW_OPENING_FEE=50 (0.05%); Cauldron version 4, read at Ethereum block 25579951.
Abracadabra's permissionless liquidate() lets any caller liquidate one or more undercollateralized users in a single call, with partial liquidation supported via maxBorrowParts; the liquidator repays MIM debt and receives seized yvWETH plus the configured liquidation multiplier as incentive. · liquidation delay None
No contractual insurance or recapitalization backstop is documented; residual cauldron bad debt has instead been addressed through ad hoc DAO treasury MIM buybacks.
No secondary feed. The ProxyOracle's oracleImplementation can be replaced by its owner (a 3-of-6 Gnosis Safe, 0xDF2C270f610Dc35d8fFDA5B453E74db5471E126B, owners confirmed via getOwners()/getThreshold() at block 25579951) with no on-chain timelock.
Abracadabra's public documentation does not describe a formal shutdown, insurance fund, or bad-debt-socialization mechanism for cauldrons; the CauldronOwner can deprecate a cauldron and cut its MIM borrow capacity, but historical under-collateralized bad debt from cauldron exploits (2024-01, 2025-03, 2025-10, recorded in this asset's mintIncidents) has been absorbed through ad hoc DAO treasury MIM buybacks rather than a documented protocol backstop.
WETH collateral (Cauldron 0x390Db10e65b5ab920C19149C919D970ad9d18A41)
WETH · max LTV 90% · MCR 111.11% · COLLATERIZATION_RATE=90000, LIQUIDATION_MULTIPLIER=104000 (4% liquidation incentive, matching this asset's pegMechanism description), BORROW_OPENING_FEE=500 (0.5%); Cauldron version 2, read at Ethereum block 25579951.
Abracadabra's permissionless liquidate() lets any caller liquidate one or more undercollateralized users in a single call, with partial liquidation supported via maxBorrowParts; the liquidator repays MIM debt and receives seized WETH plus the configured liquidation multiplier as incentive. · liquidation delay None
No contractual insurance or recapitalization backstop is documented; residual cauldron bad debt has instead been addressed through ad hoc DAO treasury MIM buybacks.
No secondary feed. Unlike the other three cauldrons' ProxyOracle (owned by a 3-of-6 Safe), this ProxyOracle's owner() is a single externally-owned account, 0xfddfE525054efaAD204600d00CA86ADb1Cc2ea8a (eth_getCode returns 0x; also one of the eleven signers on the separate 5-of-11 MIM token owner Safe), one key alone, with no multisig or timelock, can redirect this cauldron's price source.
Abracadabra's public documentation does not describe a formal shutdown, insurance fund, or bad-debt-socialization mechanism for cauldrons; the CauldronOwner can deprecate a cauldron and cut its MIM borrow capacity, but historical under-collateralized bad debt from cauldron exploits (2024-01, 2025-03, 2025-10, recorded in this asset's mintIncidents) has been absorbed through ad hoc DAO treasury MIM buybacks rather than a documented protocol backstop.
WBTC collateral (Cauldron 0x5ec47EE69BEde0b6C2A2fC0D9d094dF16C192498)
WBTC · max LTV 85% · MCR 117.65% · COLLATERIZATION_RATE=85000, LIQUIDATION_MULTIPLIER=107000 (7% liquidation incentive), BORROW_OPENING_FEE=500 (0.5%); Cauldron version 2, read at Ethereum block 25579951.
Abracadabra's permissionless liquidate() lets any caller liquidate one or more undercollateralized users in a single call, with partial liquidation supported via maxBorrowParts; the liquidator repays MIM debt and receives seized WBTC plus the configured liquidation multiplier as incentive. · liquidation delay None
No contractual insurance or recapitalization backstop is documented; residual cauldron bad debt has instead been addressed through ad hoc DAO treasury MIM buybacks.
No secondary feed. The ProxyOracle's oracleImplementation can be replaced by its owner (the same 3-of-6 Gnosis Safe, 0xDF2C270f610Dc35d8fFDA5B453E74db5471E126B, that owns the yvWETH and yvDAI ProxyOracles) with no on-chain timelock.
Abracadabra's public documentation does not describe a formal shutdown, insurance fund, or bad-debt-socialization mechanism for cauldrons; the CauldronOwner can deprecate a cauldron and cut its MIM borrow capacity, but historical under-collateralized bad debt from cauldron exploits (2024-01, 2025-03, 2025-10, recorded in this asset's mintIncidents) has been absorbed through ad hoc DAO treasury MIM buybacks rather than a documented protocol backstop.
yvDAI collateral (Cauldron 0x7Ce7D9ED62B9A6c5aCe1c6Ec9aeb115FA3064757)
yvDAI (Yearn DAI vault shares) · max LTV 98% · MCR 102.04% · COLLATERIZATION_RATE=98000, LIQUIDATION_MULTIPLIER=100500 (0.5% liquidation incentive), BORROW_OPENING_FEE=0; Cauldron version 2, read at Ethereum block 25579951.
Abracadabra's permissionless liquidate() lets any caller liquidate one or more undercollateralized users in a single call, with partial liquidation supported via maxBorrowParts; the liquidator repays MIM debt and receives seized yvDAI plus the configured liquidation multiplier as incentive. · liquidation delay None
No contractual insurance or recapitalization backstop is documented; residual cauldron bad debt has instead been addressed through ad hoc DAO treasury MIM buybacks.
No secondary or independent price source exists for the DAI leg at all; a DAI depeg is invisible to this cauldron's solvency checks. The ProxyOracle's oracleImplementation can be replaced by its owner (the same 3-of-6 Gnosis Safe, 0xDF2C270f610Dc35d8fFDA5B453E74db5471E126B, that owns the yvWETH and WBTC ProxyOracles) with no on-chain timelock.
Abracadabra's public documentation does not describe a formal shutdown, insurance fund, or bad-debt-socialization mechanism for cauldrons; the CauldronOwner can deprecate a cauldron and cut its MIM borrow capacity, but historical under-collateralized bad debt from cauldron exploits (2024-01, 2025-03, 2025-10, recorded in this asset's mintIncidents) has been absorbed through ad hoc DAO treasury MIM buybacks rather than a documented protocol backstop.
