Feeds
- Band Standard Reference Proxy secret1ezamax2vrhjpy92fnujlpwfj2dpredaafss47k SCRT/USD -> stkd_scrt_oracle secret1zw92hxdc0d2luyf43cs2f2wfpwzzwq59m853uw composing the stkd-SCRT staking contract exchange rate -> Shade Oracle Router Primary key "stkd-SCRT" -> vault pricing (quote symbol "stkd-SCRT" per the Stability Pool valid-assets registry). Composite returned 0.0793 USD, fresh at the observation time. · Shade stkd-SCRT staking-derivative oracle (code id 687, label stkd_scrt_oracle_shade_0.1) · Secret Network · 10m staleness bound
- BandChain reference data relayed to Band Standard Reference Proxy secret1ezamax2vrhjpy92fnujlpwfj2dpredaafss47k on Secret Network -> Shade Oracle Router Primary secret10n2xl5jmez6r9umtdrth78k0vwmce0l5m9f5dm (no key-specific override; default provider, key "USDT") -> ShadeLend vault pricing (quote symbol "USDT" per the Stability Pool valid-assets registry). USDT/USD returned 0.9994, fresh at the observation time. · Band Protocol via Band Standard Reference Proxy (default provider of Shade Oracle Router Primary) · Secret Network · 10m staleness bound
- BandChain reference data relayed to Band Standard Reference Proxy secret1ezamax2vrhjpy92fnujlpwfj2dpredaafss47k on Secret Network -> Shade Oracle Router Primary secret10n2xl5jmez6r9umtdrth78k0vwmce0l5m9f5dm (no key-specific override; default provider, key "USDC") -> ShadeLend vault pricing (quote symbol "USDC" per the Stability Pool valid-assets registry). USDC/USD returned 0.9999, fresh at the observation time. · Band Protocol via Band Standard Reference Proxy (default provider of Shade Oracle Router Primary) · Secret Network · 10m staleness bound · read by 2 branches
- Band Standard Reference Proxy secret1ezamax2vrhjpy92fnujlpwfj2dpredaafss47k base price -> Stride staking-derivatives oracle secret1jnp0yzwdwnft4smpnnywt6yxr288xep4aur5d4 (redemption rate set by a permissioned UpdateRates bot; contract rejects queries when the rate is stale) -> Shade Oracle Router Primary secret10n2xl5jmez6r9umtdrth78k0vwmce0l5m9f5dm key "Stride ATOM" -> ShadeLend vault pricing. Composite returned 2.7065 USD, fresh at the observation time. · Shade Stride staking-derivatives oracle (code id 926) composing Band base-asset price with a bot-updated derivative redemption rate · Secret Network · 10m staleness bound · read by 2 branches
- Band Standard Reference Proxy secret1ezamax2vrhjpy92fnujlpwfj2dpredaafss47k base price -> Stride staking-derivatives oracle secret1jnp0yzwdwnft4smpnnywt6yxr288xep4aur5d4 (redemption rate set by a permissioned UpdateRates bot; contract rejects queries when the rate is stale) -> Shade Oracle Router Primary secret10n2xl5jmez6r9umtdrth78k0vwmce0l5m9f5dm key "Stride OSMO" -> ShadeLend vault pricing. Composite returned 0.0425 USD, fresh at the observation time. · Shade Stride staking-derivatives oracle (code id 926) composing Band base-asset price with a bot-updated derivative redemption rate · Secret Network · 10m staleness bound · read by 2 branches
- BandChain reference data relayed to Band Standard Reference Proxy secret1ezamax2vrhjpy92fnujlpwfj2dpredaafss47k on Secret Network -> Shade Oracle Router Primary secret10n2xl5jmez6r9umtdrth78k0vwmce0l5m9f5dm (no key-specific override; default provider, key "ATOM") -> ShadeLend vault pricing (quote symbol "ATOM" per the Stability Pool valid-assets registry). ATOM/USD returned 1.3803, fresh at the observation time. · Band Protocol via Band Standard Reference Proxy (default provider of Shade Oracle Router Primary) · Secret Network · 10m staleness bound
- BandChain reference data relayed to Band Standard Reference Proxy secret1ezamax2vrhjpy92fnujlpwfj2dpredaafss47k on Secret Network -> Shade Oracle Router Primary secret10n2xl5jmez6r9umtdrth78k0vwmce0l5m9f5dm (no key-specific override; default provider, key "OSMO") -> ShadeLend vault pricing (quote symbol "OSMO" per the Stability Pool valid-assets registry). OSMO/USD returned 0.0292, fresh at the observation time. · Band Protocol via Band Standard Reference Proxy (default provider of Shade Oracle Router Primary) · Secret Network · 10m staleness bound
- BandChain reference data relayed to Band Standard Reference Proxy secret1ezamax2vrhjpy92fnujlpwfj2dpredaafss47k on Secret Network -> Shade Oracle Router Primary secret10n2xl5jmez6r9umtdrth78k0vwmce0l5m9f5dm (no key-specific override; default provider, key "ETH") -> ShadeLend vault pricing (quote symbol "ETH" per the Stability Pool valid-assets registry). ETH/USD returned 1,918.7, fresh at the observation time. · Band Protocol via Band Standard Reference Proxy (default provider of Shade Oracle Router Primary) · Secret Network · 10m staleness bound
- BandChain reference data relayed to Band Standard Reference Proxy secret1ezamax2vrhjpy92fnujlpwfj2dpredaafss47k on Secret Network -> Shade Oracle Router Primary secret10n2xl5jmez6r9umtdrth78k0vwmce0l5m9f5dm (default provider, key "BTC") -> ShadeLend vault pricing (quote symbol "BTC" per the Stability Pool valid-assets registry). BTC/USD returned 64,984.9, fresh at the observation time; the vault's collateral_oracle_delay staleness check is disabled (99,999,999,999,999s). · Band Protocol via Band Standard Reference Proxy (default provider of Shade Oracle Router Primary) · Secret Network
- Band Standard Reference Proxy secret1ezamax2vrhjpy92fnujlpwfj2dpredaafss47k base price -> Persistence staking-derivatives oracle secret1lgq7h9lmvc2pf408j2st649n52w50xln529jwg (redemption rate set by a permissioned UpdateRates bot; contract rejects queries when the rate is stale) -> Shade Oracle Router Primary secret10n2xl5jmez6r9umtdrth78k0vwmce0l5m9f5dm key "Persistence ATOM" -> ShadeLend vault pricing. STALE: get_price reverted at the observation time with "Derivative rate is stale. Last updated 1738935758" (2025-02-07), 18 months before the observation. · Shade Persistence staking-derivatives oracle (code id 944) composing Band base-asset price with a bot-updated derivative redemption rate · Secret Network · 10m staleness bound
- Band Standard Reference Proxy secret1ezamax2vrhjpy92fnujlpwfj2dpredaafss47k base price -> Lido staking-derivatives oracle secret166dngdltwaex4vfsdrv957g7qzavl309lcg3d5 (redemption rate set by a permissioned UpdateRates bot; contract rejects queries when the rate is stale) -> Shade Oracle Router Primary secret10n2xl5jmez6r9umtdrth78k0vwmce0l5m9f5dm key "Lido Staked ETH" -> ShadeLend vault pricing. Composite returned 2,381.6 USD, fresh at the observation time. · Shade Lido staking-derivatives oracle (code id 945) composing Band base-asset price with a bot-updated derivative redemption rate · Secret Network · 10m staleness bound
- BandChain reference data relayed to Band Standard Reference Proxy secret1ezamax2vrhjpy92fnujlpwfj2dpredaafss47k on Secret Network -> Shade Oracle Router Primary secret10n2xl5jmez6r9umtdrth78k0vwmce0l5m9f5dm (no key-specific override; default provider, key "SCRT") -> ShadeLend vault pricing (quote symbol "SCRT" per the Stability Pool valid-assets registry). SCRT/USD returned 0.0332, fresh at the observation time. · Band Protocol via Band Standard Reference Proxy (default provider of Shade Oracle Router Primary) · Secret Network · 10m staleness bound
- BandChain reference data relayed to Band Standard Reference Proxy secret1ezamax2vrhjpy92fnujlpwfj2dpredaafss47k on Secret Network -> Shade Oracle Router Primary secret10n2xl5jmez6r9umtdrth78k0vwmce0l5m9f5dm (no key-specific override; default provider, key "INJ") -> ShadeLend vault pricing (quote symbol "INJ" per the Stability Pool valid-assets registry). INJ/USD returned 4.4033, fresh at the observation time. · Band Protocol via Band Standard Reference Proxy (default provider of Shade Oracle Router Primary) · Secret Network · 10m staleness bound
- Band Standard Reference Proxy secret1ezamax2vrhjpy92fnujlpwfj2dpredaafss47k base price -> Stride staking-derivatives oracle secret1jnp0yzwdwnft4smpnnywt6yxr288xep4aur5d4 (redemption rate set by a permissioned UpdateRates bot; contract rejects queries when the rate is stale) -> Shade Oracle Router Primary secret10n2xl5jmez6r9umtdrth78k0vwmce0l5m9f5dm key "Stride INJ" -> ShadeLend vault pricing. STALE: get_price reverted at the observation time with "Derivative rate is stale. Last updated 1785351758" (2026-07-29), 10 days before the observation. · Shade Stride staking-derivatives oracle (code id 926) composing Band base-asset price with a bot-updated derivative redemption rate · Secret Network · 10m staleness bound
- Band Standard Reference Proxy secret1ezamax2vrhjpy92fnujlpwfj2dpredaafss47k SCRT/USD -> stkd_scrt_oracle secret1zw92hxdc0d2luyf43cs2f2wfpwzzwq59m853uw composite -> Shade Oracle Router Primary key "stkd-SCRT" -> vault pricing. Composite returned 0.0793 USD, fresh at the observation time. · Shade stkd-SCRT staking-derivative oracle (code id 687, label stkd_scrt_oracle_shade_0.1) · Secret Network · 10m staleness bound
BranchPricing tierShare of debtMax LTV
- ShadeLend vault 2: USDT (Axelar saUSDT)Pricing tier: Standard external0.7% of debtMax LTV 85%
- ShadeLend vault 10: Persistence stkATOMPricing tier: Single-source / laggy0.5% of debtMax LTV 65%
- ShadeLend vault 11: wstETHPricing tier: Single-source / laggy0.3% of debtMax LTV 70%
- ShadeLend vault 12: sSCRTPricing tier: Standard external0.1% of debtMax LTV 65%
- Legacy ShadeLend vault 1: stkd-SCRT (deprecated)Pricing tier: Standard external0.1% of debtMax LTV 45%
- Legacy ShadeLend vault 4: Stride stATOM (deprecated)Pricing tier: Single-source / laggy0.01% of debtMax LTV 45%
- ShadeLend vault 5: Stride stOSMOPricing tier: Single-source / laggy0% of debtMax LTV 55%
- ShadeLend vault 6: ATOMPricing tier: Standard external0% of debtMax LTV 70%
- ShadeLend vault 7: OSMOPricing tier: Standard external0% of debtMax LTV 65%
- ShadeLend vault 13: INJPricing tier: Standard external0% of debtMax LTV 70%
- ShadeLend vault 14: Stride stINJPricing tier: Single-source / laggy0% of debtMax LTV 60%
- Legacy ShadeLend vault 3: USDC (deprecated)Pricing tier: Standard external0% of debtMax LTV 85%
- Legacy ShadeLend vault 5: Stride stOSMO (deprecated)Pricing tier: Single-source / laggy0% of debtMax LTV 45%
ShadeLend vault 1: stkd-SCRT
stkd-SCRT (vault 1) · max LTV 50% · Observed 2026-08-08 at Secret Network block 26592283 by encrypted compute query (secretjs, Lavender.Five LCD gateway) against the Shade Single Vault Registry secret1qxk2scacpgj2mmm0af60674afl9e6qneg7yuny (code hash ac5d501827d9a337a618ca493fcbf1323b20771378774a6bf466cb66361bf021, matching the Shade hackathon reference's current-registry hash). Collateral token secret1k6u0cy4feepm6pehnz804zmwakuwdapm69tuc4. max_ltv 0.50, liquidation discount 10%, borrow fee 0%, interest rate 5% (target), collateral_oracle_delay 600s, status "normal", 124 open positions, elastic debt 3,561.2 SILK at block 26592283. Per-position debt and collateral amounts are private Secret Network state (registry returns zeroed position amounts); per-position LTV is exposed only for liquidatable positions.
Permissionless stability-pool liquidation: anyone can query LiquidatablePositions { vault_id } on the vault registry and execute Liquidate { vault_id, position_id } (Shade hackathon reference). The Shade Stability Pool automatically supplies SILK to repay half of the position's outstanding debt; collateral backing the loan is seized at this vault's 10% liquidation discount and distributed to Stability Pool depositors, the liquidation caller receives 10% of liquidation profits, and a 20% protocol share goes to the Shade treasury (per-vault liquidation_fee config read from the registry). No auction window or liquidation delay is documented; execution is atomic in the calling transaction. · liquidation delay None
The Shade Stability Pool (secret1wdxqz26acf2e6rsac8007pd53ak7n8tgeqr46w, code id 925 per the SCRT Labs v1.10 proposal) is the only documented liquidation backstop: pooled SILK repays liquidated debt and depositors receive the seized collateral at the vault discount. Its get_pool_info compute query at block 26592283 reported total_silk_deposited of 88,291.3 SILK (epoch 2) against 207,123.4 SILK of aggregate elastic ShadeLend debt across both registries. No insurance fund, protocol bad-debt buyer, or external liquidation backstop is documented in the reviewed sources.
No alternate oracle provider exists: Shade's tech-stack documentation lists Band Protocol as the live oracle with SupraOracles still under research, and the Oracle Router holds a single default provider (Band Standard Reference Proxy secret1ezamax2vrhjpy92fnujlpwfj2dpredaafss47k). The router's protected-key deviation guard list was empty at block 26592283, so no deviation clamp is currently enforced; an OraclesAdmin can freeze the router via Admin Auth. The Silk Index Oracle (when_stale 3600s) freezes the SILK peg at its last computed value when feeds go stale or its deviation threshold is exceeded, and requires an admin rollback to unfreeze. Vault collateral pricing enforces a per-vault collateral_oracle_delay staleness tolerance (600s on all current vaults except the frozen WBTC vault, where it is disabled at 99,999,999,999,999s); the Overseer's silk_oracle_delay for the SILK Peg leg is 21,600s. Band heartbeat for this Secret Network deployment is not published; all Band-backed keys returned sub-minute-fresh updates at the observation time.
No global shutdown, settlement, write-off, or bad-debt socialization path is documented in the reviewed sources (Shade docs, hackathon reference, shade-oracle source). The observed containment lever is per-vault governance freeze: the registry reports vault status (normal / frozen / deprecated), and frozen vaults block new borrowing while existing debt remains. Behavior when the Stability Pool holds insufficient SILK to cover a liquidation is not published. On-chain precedent at block 26592283: the frozen WBTC vault carries 37,867.7 SILK of elastic debt against near-zero remaining collateral (collateral elastic 2,097 raw units, about 0.00002097 WBTC) and its LiquidatablePositions query reverts with a divide-by-zero error, so that shortfall currently sits stranded and unsocialized.
ShadeLend vault 2: USDT (Axelar saUSDT)
USDT (vault 2) · max LTV 85% · Observed 2026-08-08 at Secret Network block 26592283 by encrypted compute query (secretjs, Lavender.Five LCD gateway) against the Shade Single Vault Registry secret1qxk2scacpgj2mmm0af60674afl9e6qneg7yuny (code hash ac5d501827d9a337a618ca493fcbf1323b20771378774a6bf466cb66361bf021, matching the Shade hackathon reference's current-registry hash). Collateral token secret1wk5j2cntwg2fgklf0uta3tlkvt87alfj7kepuw. max_ltv 0.85, liquidation discount 5%, borrow fee 0%, interest rate 5% (target), collateral_oracle_delay 600s, status "frozen", 11 open positions, elastic debt 1,522.8 SILK at block 26592283. Per-position debt and collateral amounts are private Secret Network state (registry returns zeroed position amounts); per-position LTV is exposed only for liquidatable positions.
Permissionless stability-pool liquidation: anyone can query LiquidatablePositions { vault_id } on the vault registry and execute Liquidate { vault_id, position_id } (Shade hackathon reference). The Shade Stability Pool automatically supplies SILK to repay half of the position's outstanding debt; collateral backing the loan is seized at this vault's 5% liquidation discount and distributed to Stability Pool depositors, the liquidation caller receives 10% of liquidation profits, and a 20% protocol share goes to the Shade treasury (per-vault liquidation_fee config read from the registry). No auction window or liquidation delay is documented; execution is atomic in the calling transaction. · liquidation delay None
The Shade Stability Pool (secret1wdxqz26acf2e6rsac8007pd53ak7n8tgeqr46w, code id 925 per the SCRT Labs v1.10 proposal) is the only documented liquidation backstop: pooled SILK repays liquidated debt and depositors receive the seized collateral at the vault discount. Its get_pool_info compute query at block 26592283 reported total_silk_deposited of 88,291.3 SILK (epoch 2) against 207,123.4 SILK of aggregate elastic ShadeLend debt across both registries. No insurance fund, protocol bad-debt buyer, or external liquidation backstop is documented in the reviewed sources.
No alternate oracle provider exists: Shade's tech-stack documentation lists Band Protocol as the live oracle with SupraOracles still under research, and the Oracle Router holds a single default provider (Band Standard Reference Proxy secret1ezamax2vrhjpy92fnujlpwfj2dpredaafss47k). The router's protected-key deviation guard list was empty at block 26592283, so no deviation clamp is currently enforced; an OraclesAdmin can freeze the router via Admin Auth. The Silk Index Oracle (when_stale 3600s) freezes the SILK peg at its last computed value when feeds go stale or its deviation threshold is exceeded, and requires an admin rollback to unfreeze. Vault collateral pricing enforces a per-vault collateral_oracle_delay staleness tolerance (600s on all current vaults except the frozen WBTC vault, where it is disabled at 99,999,999,999,999s); the Overseer's silk_oracle_delay for the SILK Peg leg is 21,600s. Band heartbeat for this Secret Network deployment is not published; all Band-backed keys returned sub-minute-fresh updates at the observation time.
No global shutdown, settlement, write-off, or bad-debt socialization path is documented in the reviewed sources (Shade docs, hackathon reference, shade-oracle source). The observed containment lever is per-vault governance freeze: the registry reports vault status (normal / frozen / deprecated), and frozen vaults block new borrowing while existing debt remains. Behavior when the Stability Pool holds insufficient SILK to cover a liquidation is not published. On-chain precedent at block 26592283: the frozen WBTC vault carries 37,867.7 SILK of elastic debt against near-zero remaining collateral (collateral elastic 2,097 raw units, about 0.00002097 WBTC) and its LiquidatablePositions query reverts with a divide-by-zero error, so that shortfall currently sits stranded and unsocialized.
ShadeLend vault 3: USDC (Axelar saUSDC)
USDC (vault 3) · max LTV 85% · Observed 2026-08-08 at Secret Network block 26592283 by encrypted compute query (secretjs, Lavender.Five LCD gateway) against the Shade Single Vault Registry secret1qxk2scacpgj2mmm0af60674afl9e6qneg7yuny (code hash ac5d501827d9a337a618ca493fcbf1323b20771378774a6bf466cb66361bf021, matching the Shade hackathon reference's current-registry hash). Collateral token secret1vkq022x4q8t8kx9de3r84u669l65xnwf2lg3e6. max_ltv 0.85, liquidation discount 5%, borrow fee 0%, interest rate 5% (target), collateral_oracle_delay 600s, status "frozen", 24 open positions, elastic debt 5,094.0 SILK at block 26592283. Per-position debt and collateral amounts are private Secret Network state (registry returns zeroed position amounts); per-position LTV is exposed only for liquidatable positions.
Permissionless stability-pool liquidation: anyone can query LiquidatablePositions { vault_id } on the vault registry and execute Liquidate { vault_id, position_id } (Shade hackathon reference). The Shade Stability Pool automatically supplies SILK to repay half of the position's outstanding debt; collateral backing the loan is seized at this vault's 5% liquidation discount and distributed to Stability Pool depositors, the liquidation caller receives 10% of liquidation profits, and a 20% protocol share goes to the Shade treasury (per-vault liquidation_fee config read from the registry). No auction window or liquidation delay is documented; execution is atomic in the calling transaction. · liquidation delay None
The Shade Stability Pool (secret1wdxqz26acf2e6rsac8007pd53ak7n8tgeqr46w, code id 925 per the SCRT Labs v1.10 proposal) is the only documented liquidation backstop: pooled SILK repays liquidated debt and depositors receive the seized collateral at the vault discount. Its get_pool_info compute query at block 26592283 reported total_silk_deposited of 88,291.3 SILK (epoch 2) against 207,123.4 SILK of aggregate elastic ShadeLend debt across both registries. No insurance fund, protocol bad-debt buyer, or external liquidation backstop is documented in the reviewed sources.
No alternate oracle provider exists: Shade's tech-stack documentation lists Band Protocol as the live oracle with SupraOracles still under research, and the Oracle Router holds a single default provider (Band Standard Reference Proxy secret1ezamax2vrhjpy92fnujlpwfj2dpredaafss47k). The router's protected-key deviation guard list was empty at block 26592283, so no deviation clamp is currently enforced; an OraclesAdmin can freeze the router via Admin Auth. The Silk Index Oracle (when_stale 3600s) freezes the SILK peg at its last computed value when feeds go stale or its deviation threshold is exceeded, and requires an admin rollback to unfreeze. Vault collateral pricing enforces a per-vault collateral_oracle_delay staleness tolerance (600s on all current vaults except the frozen WBTC vault, where it is disabled at 99,999,999,999,999s); the Overseer's silk_oracle_delay for the SILK Peg leg is 21,600s. Band heartbeat for this Secret Network deployment is not published; all Band-backed keys returned sub-minute-fresh updates at the observation time.
No global shutdown, settlement, write-off, or bad-debt socialization path is documented in the reviewed sources (Shade docs, hackathon reference, shade-oracle source). The observed containment lever is per-vault governance freeze: the registry reports vault status (normal / frozen / deprecated), and frozen vaults block new borrowing while existing debt remains. Behavior when the Stability Pool holds insufficient SILK to cover a liquidation is not published. On-chain precedent at block 26592283: the frozen WBTC vault carries 37,867.7 SILK of elastic debt against near-zero remaining collateral (collateral elastic 2,097 raw units, about 0.00002097 WBTC) and its LiquidatablePositions query reverts with a divide-by-zero error, so that shortfall currently sits stranded and unsocialized.
ShadeLend vault 4: Stride stATOM
Stride stATOM (vault 4) · max LTV 65% · Observed 2026-08-08 at Secret Network block 26592283 by encrypted compute query (secretjs, Lavender.Five LCD gateway) against the Shade Single Vault Registry secret1qxk2scacpgj2mmm0af60674afl9e6qneg7yuny (code hash ac5d501827d9a337a618ca493fcbf1323b20771378774a6bf466cb66361bf021, matching the Shade hackathon reference's current-registry hash). Collateral token secret155w9uxruypsltvqfygh5urghd5v0zc6f9g69sq. max_ltv 0.65, liquidation discount 10%, borrow fee 0%, interest rate 5% (target), collateral_oracle_delay 600s, status "normal", 62 open positions, elastic debt 1,954.2 SILK at block 26592283. Per-position debt and collateral amounts are private Secret Network state (registry returns zeroed position amounts); per-position LTV is exposed only for liquidatable positions.
Permissionless stability-pool liquidation: anyone can query LiquidatablePositions { vault_id } on the vault registry and execute Liquidate { vault_id, position_id } (Shade hackathon reference). The Shade Stability Pool automatically supplies SILK to repay half of the position's outstanding debt; collateral backing the loan is seized at this vault's 10% liquidation discount and distributed to Stability Pool depositors, the liquidation caller receives 10% of liquidation profits, and a 20% protocol share goes to the Shade treasury (per-vault liquidation_fee config read from the registry). No auction window or liquidation delay is documented; execution is atomic in the calling transaction. · liquidation delay None
The Shade Stability Pool (secret1wdxqz26acf2e6rsac8007pd53ak7n8tgeqr46w, code id 925 per the SCRT Labs v1.10 proposal) is the only documented liquidation backstop: pooled SILK repays liquidated debt and depositors receive the seized collateral at the vault discount. Its get_pool_info compute query at block 26592283 reported total_silk_deposited of 88,291.3 SILK (epoch 2) against 207,123.4 SILK of aggregate elastic ShadeLend debt across both registries. No insurance fund, protocol bad-debt buyer, or external liquidation backstop is documented in the reviewed sources.
No alternate oracle provider exists: Shade's tech-stack documentation lists Band Protocol as the live oracle with SupraOracles still under research, and the Oracle Router holds a single default provider (Band Standard Reference Proxy secret1ezamax2vrhjpy92fnujlpwfj2dpredaafss47k). The router's protected-key deviation guard list was empty at block 26592283, so no deviation clamp is currently enforced; an OraclesAdmin can freeze the router via Admin Auth. The Silk Index Oracle (when_stale 3600s) freezes the SILK peg at its last computed value when feeds go stale or its deviation threshold is exceeded, and requires an admin rollback to unfreeze. Vault collateral pricing enforces a per-vault collateral_oracle_delay staleness tolerance (600s on all current vaults except the frozen WBTC vault, where it is disabled at 99,999,999,999,999s); the Overseer's silk_oracle_delay for the SILK Peg leg is 21,600s. Band heartbeat for this Secret Network deployment is not published; all Band-backed keys returned sub-minute-fresh updates at the observation time.
No global shutdown, settlement, write-off, or bad-debt socialization path is documented in the reviewed sources (Shade docs, hackathon reference, shade-oracle source). The observed containment lever is per-vault governance freeze: the registry reports vault status (normal / frozen / deprecated), and frozen vaults block new borrowing while existing debt remains. Behavior when the Stability Pool holds insufficient SILK to cover a liquidation is not published. On-chain precedent at block 26592283: the frozen WBTC vault carries 37,867.7 SILK of elastic debt against near-zero remaining collateral (collateral elastic 2,097 raw units, about 0.00002097 WBTC) and its LiquidatablePositions query reverts with a divide-by-zero error, so that shortfall currently sits stranded and unsocialized.
ShadeLend vault 5: Stride stOSMO
Stride stOSMO (vault 5) · max LTV 55% · Observed 2026-08-08 at Secret Network block 26592283 by encrypted compute query (secretjs, Lavender.Five LCD gateway) against the Shade Single Vault Registry secret1qxk2scacpgj2mmm0af60674afl9e6qneg7yuny (code hash ac5d501827d9a337a618ca493fcbf1323b20771378774a6bf466cb66361bf021, matching the Shade hackathon reference's current-registry hash). Collateral token secret1jrp6z8v679yaq65rndsr970mhaxzgfkymvc58g. max_ltv 0.55, liquidation discount 10%, borrow fee 0%, interest rate 5% (target), collateral_oracle_delay 600s, status "normal", 14 open positions, elastic debt 0.0 SILK at block 26592283. Per-position debt and collateral amounts are private Secret Network state (registry returns zeroed position amounts); per-position LTV is exposed only for liquidatable positions.
Permissionless stability-pool liquidation: anyone can query LiquidatablePositions { vault_id } on the vault registry and execute Liquidate { vault_id, position_id } (Shade hackathon reference). The Shade Stability Pool automatically supplies SILK to repay half of the position's outstanding debt; collateral backing the loan is seized at this vault's 10% liquidation discount and distributed to Stability Pool depositors, the liquidation caller receives 10% of liquidation profits, and a 20% protocol share goes to the Shade treasury (per-vault liquidation_fee config read from the registry). No auction window or liquidation delay is documented; execution is atomic in the calling transaction. · liquidation delay None
The Shade Stability Pool (secret1wdxqz26acf2e6rsac8007pd53ak7n8tgeqr46w, code id 925 per the SCRT Labs v1.10 proposal) is the only documented liquidation backstop: pooled SILK repays liquidated debt and depositors receive the seized collateral at the vault discount. Its get_pool_info compute query at block 26592283 reported total_silk_deposited of 88,291.3 SILK (epoch 2) against 207,123.4 SILK of aggregate elastic ShadeLend debt across both registries. No insurance fund, protocol bad-debt buyer, or external liquidation backstop is documented in the reviewed sources.
No alternate oracle provider exists: Shade's tech-stack documentation lists Band Protocol as the live oracle with SupraOracles still under research, and the Oracle Router holds a single default provider (Band Standard Reference Proxy secret1ezamax2vrhjpy92fnujlpwfj2dpredaafss47k). The router's protected-key deviation guard list was empty at block 26592283, so no deviation clamp is currently enforced; an OraclesAdmin can freeze the router via Admin Auth. The Silk Index Oracle (when_stale 3600s) freezes the SILK peg at its last computed value when feeds go stale or its deviation threshold is exceeded, and requires an admin rollback to unfreeze. Vault collateral pricing enforces a per-vault collateral_oracle_delay staleness tolerance (600s on all current vaults except the frozen WBTC vault, where it is disabled at 99,999,999,999,999s); the Overseer's silk_oracle_delay for the SILK Peg leg is 21,600s. Band heartbeat for this Secret Network deployment is not published; all Band-backed keys returned sub-minute-fresh updates at the observation time.
No global shutdown, settlement, write-off, or bad-debt socialization path is documented in the reviewed sources (Shade docs, hackathon reference, shade-oracle source). The observed containment lever is per-vault governance freeze: the registry reports vault status (normal / frozen / deprecated), and frozen vaults block new borrowing while existing debt remains. Behavior when the Stability Pool holds insufficient SILK to cover a liquidation is not published. On-chain precedent at block 26592283: the frozen WBTC vault carries 37,867.7 SILK of elastic debt against near-zero remaining collateral (collateral elastic 2,097 raw units, about 0.00002097 WBTC) and its LiquidatablePositions query reverts with a divide-by-zero error, so that shortfall currently sits stranded and unsocialized.
ShadeLend vault 6: ATOM
ATOM (vault 6) · max LTV 70% · Observed 2026-08-08 at Secret Network block 26592283 by encrypted compute query (secretjs, Lavender.Five LCD gateway) against the Shade Single Vault Registry secret1qxk2scacpgj2mmm0af60674afl9e6qneg7yuny (code hash ac5d501827d9a337a618ca493fcbf1323b20771378774a6bf466cb66361bf021, matching the Shade hackathon reference's current-registry hash). Collateral token secret19e75l25r6sa6nhdf4lggjmgpw0vmpfvsw5cnpe. max_ltv 0.70, liquidation discount 10%, borrow fee 0%, interest rate 5% (target), collateral_oracle_delay 600s, status "normal", 21 open positions, elastic debt 0.0 SILK at block 26592283. Per-position debt and collateral amounts are private Secret Network state (registry returns zeroed position amounts); per-position LTV is exposed only for liquidatable positions.
Permissionless stability-pool liquidation: anyone can query LiquidatablePositions { vault_id } on the vault registry and execute Liquidate { vault_id, position_id } (Shade hackathon reference). The Shade Stability Pool automatically supplies SILK to repay half of the position's outstanding debt; collateral backing the loan is seized at this vault's 10% liquidation discount and distributed to Stability Pool depositors, the liquidation caller receives 10% of liquidation profits, and a 20% protocol share goes to the Shade treasury (per-vault liquidation_fee config read from the registry). No auction window or liquidation delay is documented; execution is atomic in the calling transaction. · liquidation delay None
The Shade Stability Pool (secret1wdxqz26acf2e6rsac8007pd53ak7n8tgeqr46w, code id 925 per the SCRT Labs v1.10 proposal) is the only documented liquidation backstop: pooled SILK repays liquidated debt and depositors receive the seized collateral at the vault discount. Its get_pool_info compute query at block 26592283 reported total_silk_deposited of 88,291.3 SILK (epoch 2) against 207,123.4 SILK of aggregate elastic ShadeLend debt across both registries. No insurance fund, protocol bad-debt buyer, or external liquidation backstop is documented in the reviewed sources.
No alternate oracle provider exists: Shade's tech-stack documentation lists Band Protocol as the live oracle with SupraOracles still under research, and the Oracle Router holds a single default provider (Band Standard Reference Proxy secret1ezamax2vrhjpy92fnujlpwfj2dpredaafss47k). The router's protected-key deviation guard list was empty at block 26592283, so no deviation clamp is currently enforced; an OraclesAdmin can freeze the router via Admin Auth. The Silk Index Oracle (when_stale 3600s) freezes the SILK peg at its last computed value when feeds go stale or its deviation threshold is exceeded, and requires an admin rollback to unfreeze. Vault collateral pricing enforces a per-vault collateral_oracle_delay staleness tolerance (600s on all current vaults except the frozen WBTC vault, where it is disabled at 99,999,999,999,999s); the Overseer's silk_oracle_delay for the SILK Peg leg is 21,600s. Band heartbeat for this Secret Network deployment is not published; all Band-backed keys returned sub-minute-fresh updates at the observation time.
No global shutdown, settlement, write-off, or bad-debt socialization path is documented in the reviewed sources (Shade docs, hackathon reference, shade-oracle source). The observed containment lever is per-vault governance freeze: the registry reports vault status (normal / frozen / deprecated), and frozen vaults block new borrowing while existing debt remains. Behavior when the Stability Pool holds insufficient SILK to cover a liquidation is not published. On-chain precedent at block 26592283: the frozen WBTC vault carries 37,867.7 SILK of elastic debt against near-zero remaining collateral (collateral elastic 2,097 raw units, about 0.00002097 WBTC) and its LiquidatablePositions query reverts with a divide-by-zero error, so that shortfall currently sits stranded and unsocialized.
ShadeLend vault 7: OSMO
OSMO (vault 7) · max LTV 65% · Observed 2026-08-08 at Secret Network block 26592283 by encrypted compute query (secretjs, Lavender.Five LCD gateway) against the Shade Single Vault Registry secret1qxk2scacpgj2mmm0af60674afl9e6qneg7yuny (code hash ac5d501827d9a337a618ca493fcbf1323b20771378774a6bf466cb66361bf021, matching the Shade hackathon reference's current-registry hash). Collateral token secret150jec8mc2hzyyqak4umv6cfevelr0x9p0mjxgg. max_ltv 0.65, liquidation discount 10%, borrow fee 0%, interest rate 5% (target), collateral_oracle_delay 600s, status "normal", 9 open positions, elastic debt 0.0 SILK at block 26592283. Per-position debt and collateral amounts are private Secret Network state (registry returns zeroed position amounts); per-position LTV is exposed only for liquidatable positions.
Permissionless stability-pool liquidation: anyone can query LiquidatablePositions { vault_id } on the vault registry and execute Liquidate { vault_id, position_id } (Shade hackathon reference). The Shade Stability Pool automatically supplies SILK to repay half of the position's outstanding debt; collateral backing the loan is seized at this vault's 10% liquidation discount and distributed to Stability Pool depositors, the liquidation caller receives 10% of liquidation profits, and a 20% protocol share goes to the Shade treasury (per-vault liquidation_fee config read from the registry). No auction window or liquidation delay is documented; execution is atomic in the calling transaction. · liquidation delay None
The Shade Stability Pool (secret1wdxqz26acf2e6rsac8007pd53ak7n8tgeqr46w, code id 925 per the SCRT Labs v1.10 proposal) is the only documented liquidation backstop: pooled SILK repays liquidated debt and depositors receive the seized collateral at the vault discount. Its get_pool_info compute query at block 26592283 reported total_silk_deposited of 88,291.3 SILK (epoch 2) against 207,123.4 SILK of aggregate elastic ShadeLend debt across both registries. No insurance fund, protocol bad-debt buyer, or external liquidation backstop is documented in the reviewed sources.
No alternate oracle provider exists: Shade's tech-stack documentation lists Band Protocol as the live oracle with SupraOracles still under research, and the Oracle Router holds a single default provider (Band Standard Reference Proxy secret1ezamax2vrhjpy92fnujlpwfj2dpredaafss47k). The router's protected-key deviation guard list was empty at block 26592283, so no deviation clamp is currently enforced; an OraclesAdmin can freeze the router via Admin Auth. The Silk Index Oracle (when_stale 3600s) freezes the SILK peg at its last computed value when feeds go stale or its deviation threshold is exceeded, and requires an admin rollback to unfreeze. Vault collateral pricing enforces a per-vault collateral_oracle_delay staleness tolerance (600s on all current vaults except the frozen WBTC vault, where it is disabled at 99,999,999,999,999s); the Overseer's silk_oracle_delay for the SILK Peg leg is 21,600s. Band heartbeat for this Secret Network deployment is not published; all Band-backed keys returned sub-minute-fresh updates at the observation time.
No global shutdown, settlement, write-off, or bad-debt socialization path is documented in the reviewed sources (Shade docs, hackathon reference, shade-oracle source). The observed containment lever is per-vault governance freeze: the registry reports vault status (normal / frozen / deprecated), and frozen vaults block new borrowing while existing debt remains. Behavior when the Stability Pool holds insufficient SILK to cover a liquidation is not published. On-chain precedent at block 26592283: the frozen WBTC vault carries 37,867.7 SILK of elastic debt against near-zero remaining collateral (collateral elastic 2,097 raw units, about 0.00002097 WBTC) and its LiquidatablePositions query reverts with a divide-by-zero error, so that shortfall currently sits stranded and unsocialized.
ShadeLend vault 8: WETH (Axelar saWETH)
WETH (vault 8) · max LTV 75% · Observed 2026-08-08 at Secret Network block 26592283 by encrypted compute query (secretjs, Lavender.Five LCD gateway) against the Shade Single Vault Registry secret1qxk2scacpgj2mmm0af60674afl9e6qneg7yuny (code hash ac5d501827d9a337a618ca493fcbf1323b20771378774a6bf466cb66361bf021, matching the Shade hackathon reference's current-registry hash). Collateral token secret139qfh3nmuzfgwsx2npnmnjl4hrvj3xq5rmq8a0. max_ltv 0.75, liquidation discount 10%, borrow fee 0%, interest rate 5% (target), collateral_oracle_delay 600s, status "frozen", 40 open positions, elastic debt 155,041.2 SILK at block 26592283. Per-position debt and collateral amounts are private Secret Network state (registry returns zeroed position amounts); per-position LTV is exposed only for liquidatable positions.
Permissionless stability-pool liquidation: anyone can query LiquidatablePositions { vault_id } on the vault registry and execute Liquidate { vault_id, position_id } (Shade hackathon reference). The Shade Stability Pool automatically supplies SILK to repay half of the position's outstanding debt; collateral backing the loan is seized at this vault's 10% liquidation discount and distributed to Stability Pool depositors, the liquidation caller receives 10% of liquidation profits, and a 20% protocol share goes to the Shade treasury (per-vault liquidation_fee config read from the registry). No auction window or liquidation delay is documented; execution is atomic in the calling transaction. · liquidation delay None
The Shade Stability Pool (secret1wdxqz26acf2e6rsac8007pd53ak7n8tgeqr46w, code id 925 per the SCRT Labs v1.10 proposal) is the only documented liquidation backstop: pooled SILK repays liquidated debt and depositors receive the seized collateral at the vault discount. Its get_pool_info compute query at block 26592283 reported total_silk_deposited of 88,291.3 SILK (epoch 2) against 207,123.4 SILK of aggregate elastic ShadeLend debt across both registries. No insurance fund, protocol bad-debt buyer, or external liquidation backstop is documented in the reviewed sources.
No alternate oracle provider exists: Shade's tech-stack documentation lists Band Protocol as the live oracle with SupraOracles still under research, and the Oracle Router holds a single default provider (Band Standard Reference Proxy secret1ezamax2vrhjpy92fnujlpwfj2dpredaafss47k). The router's protected-key deviation guard list was empty at block 26592283, so no deviation clamp is currently enforced; an OraclesAdmin can freeze the router via Admin Auth. The Silk Index Oracle (when_stale 3600s) freezes the SILK peg at its last computed value when feeds go stale or its deviation threshold is exceeded, and requires an admin rollback to unfreeze. Vault collateral pricing enforces a per-vault collateral_oracle_delay staleness tolerance (600s on all current vaults except the frozen WBTC vault, where it is disabled at 99,999,999,999,999s); the Overseer's silk_oracle_delay for the SILK Peg leg is 21,600s. Band heartbeat for this Secret Network deployment is not published; all Band-backed keys returned sub-minute-fresh updates at the observation time.
No global shutdown, settlement, write-off, or bad-debt socialization path is documented in the reviewed sources (Shade docs, hackathon reference, shade-oracle source). The observed containment lever is per-vault governance freeze: the registry reports vault status (normal / frozen / deprecated), and frozen vaults block new borrowing while existing debt remains. Behavior when the Stability Pool holds insufficient SILK to cover a liquidation is not published. On-chain precedent at block 26592283: the frozen WBTC vault carries 37,867.7 SILK of elastic debt against near-zero remaining collateral (collateral elastic 2,097 raw units, about 0.00002097 WBTC) and its LiquidatablePositions query reverts with a divide-by-zero error, so that shortfall currently sits stranded and unsocialized.
ShadeLend vault 9: WBTC (Axelar saWBTC) - frozen with stranded debt
WBTC (vault 9) · max LTV 85% · Observed 2026-08-08 at Secret Network block 26592283 by encrypted compute query (secretjs, Lavender.Five LCD gateway) against the Shade Single Vault Registry secret1qxk2scacpgj2mmm0af60674afl9e6qneg7yuny (code hash ac5d501827d9a337a618ca493fcbf1323b20771378774a6bf466cb66361bf021, matching the Shade hackathon reference's current-registry hash). Collateral token secret1guyayjwg5f84daaxl7w84skd8naxvq8vz9upqx. max_ltv 0.85, liquidation discount 5%, borrow fee 0%, interest rate 5% (target), collateral_oracle_delay 99,999,999,999,999s (staleness check disabled), status "frozen", 39 open positions, elastic debt 37,867.7 SILK at block 26592283. Per-position debt and collateral amounts are private Secret Network state (registry returns zeroed position amounts); per-position LTV is exposed only for liquidatable positions.
Permissionless stability-pool liquidation: anyone can query LiquidatablePositions { vault_id } on the vault registry and execute Liquidate { vault_id, position_id } (Shade hackathon reference). The Shade Stability Pool automatically supplies SILK to repay half of the position's outstanding debt; collateral backing the loan is seized at this vault's 5% liquidation discount and distributed to Stability Pool depositors, the liquidation caller receives 10% of liquidation profits, and a 20% protocol share goes to the Shade treasury (per-vault liquidation_fee config read from the registry). No auction window or liquidation delay is documented; execution is atomic in the calling transaction. · liquidation delay None
The Shade Stability Pool (secret1wdxqz26acf2e6rsac8007pd53ak7n8tgeqr46w, code id 925 per the SCRT Labs v1.10 proposal) is the only documented liquidation backstop: pooled SILK repays liquidated debt and depositors receive the seized collateral at the vault discount. Its get_pool_info compute query at block 26592283 reported total_silk_deposited of 88,291.3 SILK (epoch 2) against 207,123.4 SILK of aggregate elastic ShadeLend debt across both registries. No insurance fund, protocol bad-debt buyer, or external liquidation backstop is documented in the reviewed sources.
No alternate oracle provider exists: Shade's tech-stack documentation lists Band Protocol as the live oracle with SupraOracles still under research, and the Oracle Router holds a single default provider (Band Standard Reference Proxy secret1ezamax2vrhjpy92fnujlpwfj2dpredaafss47k). The router's protected-key deviation guard list was empty at block 26592283, so no deviation clamp is currently enforced; an OraclesAdmin can freeze the router via Admin Auth. The Silk Index Oracle (when_stale 3600s) freezes the SILK peg at its last computed value when feeds go stale or its deviation threshold is exceeded, and requires an admin rollback to unfreeze. Vault collateral pricing enforces a per-vault collateral_oracle_delay staleness tolerance (600s on all current vaults except the frozen WBTC vault, where it is disabled at 99,999,999,999,999s); the Overseer's silk_oracle_delay for the SILK Peg leg is 21,600s. Band heartbeat for this Secret Network deployment is not published; all Band-backed keys returned sub-minute-fresh updates at the observation time.
No global shutdown, settlement, write-off, or bad-debt socialization path is documented in the reviewed sources (Shade docs, hackathon reference, shade-oracle source). The observed containment lever is per-vault governance freeze: the registry reports vault status (normal / frozen / deprecated), and frozen vaults block new borrowing while existing debt remains. Behavior when the Stability Pool holds insufficient SILK to cover a liquidation is not published. On-chain precedent at block 26592283: the frozen WBTC vault carries 37,867.7 SILK of elastic debt against near-zero remaining collateral (collateral elastic 2,097 raw units, about 0.00002097 WBTC) and its LiquidatablePositions query reverts with a divide-by-zero error, so that shortfall currently sits stranded and unsocialized. For this branch the bad-debt state is not hypothetical: the vault is frozen, its collateral base is effectively exhausted, liquidation enumeration reverts (divide-by-zero in the vault's muldiv), and no reviewed source documents how or whether the 37,867.7 SILK shortfall will be settled. No public postmortem was located for the incident that produced this state (searched 2026-08-08: web queries for a Shade/ShadeLend WBTC vault exploit or oracle incident returned no protocol disclosure).
ShadeLend vault 10: Persistence stkATOM
Persistence stkATOM (vault 10) · max LTV 65% · Observed 2026-08-08 at Secret Network block 26592283 by encrypted compute query (secretjs, Lavender.Five LCD gateway) against the Shade Single Vault Registry secret1qxk2scacpgj2mmm0af60674afl9e6qneg7yuny (code hash ac5d501827d9a337a618ca493fcbf1323b20771378774a6bf466cb66361bf021, matching the Shade hackathon reference's current-registry hash). Collateral token secret16vjfe24un4z7d3sp9vd0cmmfmz397nh2njpw3e. max_ltv 0.65, liquidation discount 5%, borrow fee 0%, interest rate 5% (target), collateral_oracle_delay 600s, status "normal", 13 open positions, elastic debt 1,071.0 SILK at block 26592283. Per-position debt and collateral amounts are private Secret Network state (registry returns zeroed position amounts); per-position LTV is exposed only for liquidatable positions.
Permissionless stability-pool liquidation: anyone can query LiquidatablePositions { vault_id } on the vault registry and execute Liquidate { vault_id, position_id } (Shade hackathon reference). The Shade Stability Pool automatically supplies SILK to repay half of the position's outstanding debt; collateral backing the loan is seized at this vault's 5% liquidation discount and distributed to Stability Pool depositors, the liquidation caller receives 10% of liquidation profits, and a 20% protocol share goes to the Shade treasury (per-vault liquidation_fee config read from the registry). No auction window or liquidation delay is documented; execution is atomic in the calling transaction. · liquidation delay None
The Shade Stability Pool (secret1wdxqz26acf2e6rsac8007pd53ak7n8tgeqr46w, code id 925 per the SCRT Labs v1.10 proposal) is the only documented liquidation backstop: pooled SILK repays liquidated debt and depositors receive the seized collateral at the vault discount. Its get_pool_info compute query at block 26592283 reported total_silk_deposited of 88,291.3 SILK (epoch 2) against 207,123.4 SILK of aggregate elastic ShadeLend debt across both registries. No insurance fund, protocol bad-debt buyer, or external liquidation backstop is documented in the reviewed sources.
No alternate oracle provider exists: Shade's tech-stack documentation lists Band Protocol as the live oracle with SupraOracles still under research, and the Oracle Router holds a single default provider (Band Standard Reference Proxy secret1ezamax2vrhjpy92fnujlpwfj2dpredaafss47k). The router's protected-key deviation guard list was empty at block 26592283, so no deviation clamp is currently enforced; an OraclesAdmin can freeze the router via Admin Auth. The Silk Index Oracle (when_stale 3600s) freezes the SILK peg at its last computed value when feeds go stale or its deviation threshold is exceeded, and requires an admin rollback to unfreeze. Vault collateral pricing enforces a per-vault collateral_oracle_delay staleness tolerance (600s on all current vaults except the frozen WBTC vault, where it is disabled at 99,999,999,999,999s); the Overseer's silk_oracle_delay for the SILK Peg leg is 21,600s. Band heartbeat for this Secret Network deployment is not published; all Band-backed keys returned sub-minute-fresh updates at the observation time.
No global shutdown, settlement, write-off, or bad-debt socialization path is documented in the reviewed sources (Shade docs, hackathon reference, shade-oracle source). The observed containment lever is per-vault governance freeze: the registry reports vault status (normal / frozen / deprecated), and frozen vaults block new borrowing while existing debt remains. Behavior when the Stability Pool holds insufficient SILK to cover a liquidation is not published. On-chain precedent at block 26592283: the frozen WBTC vault carries 37,867.7 SILK of elastic debt against near-zero remaining collateral (collateral elastic 2,097 raw units, about 0.00002097 WBTC) and its LiquidatablePositions query reverts with a divide-by-zero error, so that shortfall currently sits stranded and unsocialized. Branch-specific liveness failure observed at block 26592283: with the redemption rate stale since 2025-02-07, this vault's price queries revert, so neither liquidations nor oracle-dependent repayments can execute through the standard path; the debt is effectively frozen in place without a documented settlement path.
ShadeLend vault 11: wstETH
wstETH (vault 11) · max LTV 70% · Observed 2026-08-08 at Secret Network block 26592283 by encrypted compute query (secretjs, Lavender.Five LCD gateway) against the Shade Single Vault Registry secret1qxk2scacpgj2mmm0af60674afl9e6qneg7yuny (code hash ac5d501827d9a337a618ca493fcbf1323b20771378774a6bf466cb66361bf021, matching the Shade hackathon reference's current-registry hash). Collateral token secret148jzxkagwe0xulf8jt3sw4nuh2shdh788z3gyd. max_ltv 0.70, liquidation discount 10%, borrow fee 0%, interest rate 5% (target), collateral_oracle_delay 600s, status "frozen", 16 open positions, elastic debt 711.2 SILK at block 26592283. Per-position debt and collateral amounts are private Secret Network state (registry returns zeroed position amounts); per-position LTV is exposed only for liquidatable positions.
Permissionless stability-pool liquidation: anyone can query LiquidatablePositions { vault_id } on the vault registry and execute Liquidate { vault_id, position_id } (Shade hackathon reference). The Shade Stability Pool automatically supplies SILK to repay half of the position's outstanding debt; collateral backing the loan is seized at this vault's 10% liquidation discount and distributed to Stability Pool depositors, the liquidation caller receives 10% of liquidation profits, and a 20% protocol share goes to the Shade treasury (per-vault liquidation_fee config read from the registry). No auction window or liquidation delay is documented; execution is atomic in the calling transaction. · liquidation delay None
The Shade Stability Pool (secret1wdxqz26acf2e6rsac8007pd53ak7n8tgeqr46w, code id 925 per the SCRT Labs v1.10 proposal) is the only documented liquidation backstop: pooled SILK repays liquidated debt and depositors receive the seized collateral at the vault discount. Its get_pool_info compute query at block 26592283 reported total_silk_deposited of 88,291.3 SILK (epoch 2) against 207,123.4 SILK of aggregate elastic ShadeLend debt across both registries. No insurance fund, protocol bad-debt buyer, or external liquidation backstop is documented in the reviewed sources.
No alternate oracle provider exists: Shade's tech-stack documentation lists Band Protocol as the live oracle with SupraOracles still under research, and the Oracle Router holds a single default provider (Band Standard Reference Proxy secret1ezamax2vrhjpy92fnujlpwfj2dpredaafss47k). The router's protected-key deviation guard list was empty at block 26592283, so no deviation clamp is currently enforced; an OraclesAdmin can freeze the router via Admin Auth. The Silk Index Oracle (when_stale 3600s) freezes the SILK peg at its last computed value when feeds go stale or its deviation threshold is exceeded, and requires an admin rollback to unfreeze. Vault collateral pricing enforces a per-vault collateral_oracle_delay staleness tolerance (600s on all current vaults except the frozen WBTC vault, where it is disabled at 99,999,999,999,999s); the Overseer's silk_oracle_delay for the SILK Peg leg is 21,600s. Band heartbeat for this Secret Network deployment is not published; all Band-backed keys returned sub-minute-fresh updates at the observation time.
No global shutdown, settlement, write-off, or bad-debt socialization path is documented in the reviewed sources (Shade docs, hackathon reference, shade-oracle source). The observed containment lever is per-vault governance freeze: the registry reports vault status (normal / frozen / deprecated), and frozen vaults block new borrowing while existing debt remains. Behavior when the Stability Pool holds insufficient SILK to cover a liquidation is not published. On-chain precedent at block 26592283: the frozen WBTC vault carries 37,867.7 SILK of elastic debt against near-zero remaining collateral (collateral elastic 2,097 raw units, about 0.00002097 WBTC) and its LiquidatablePositions query reverts with a divide-by-zero error, so that shortfall currently sits stranded and unsocialized.
ShadeLend vault 12: sSCRT
sSCRT (vault 12) · max LTV 65% · Observed 2026-08-08 at Secret Network block 26592283 by encrypted compute query (secretjs, Lavender.Five LCD gateway) against the Shade Single Vault Registry secret1qxk2scacpgj2mmm0af60674afl9e6qneg7yuny (code hash ac5d501827d9a337a618ca493fcbf1323b20771378774a6bf466cb66361bf021, matching the Shade hackathon reference's current-registry hash). Collateral token secret1k0jntykt7e4g3y88ltc60czgjuqdy4c9e8fzek. max_ltv 0.65, liquidation discount 10%, borrow fee 0%, interest rate 5% (target), collateral_oracle_delay 600s, status "normal", 21 open positions, elastic debt 117.8 SILK at block 26592283. Per-position debt and collateral amounts are private Secret Network state (registry returns zeroed position amounts); per-position LTV is exposed only for liquidatable positions.
Permissionless stability-pool liquidation: anyone can query LiquidatablePositions { vault_id } on the vault registry and execute Liquidate { vault_id, position_id } (Shade hackathon reference). The Shade Stability Pool automatically supplies SILK to repay half of the position's outstanding debt; collateral backing the loan is seized at this vault's 10% liquidation discount and distributed to Stability Pool depositors, the liquidation caller receives 10% of liquidation profits, and a 20% protocol share goes to the Shade treasury (per-vault liquidation_fee config read from the registry). No auction window or liquidation delay is documented; execution is atomic in the calling transaction. · liquidation delay None
The Shade Stability Pool (secret1wdxqz26acf2e6rsac8007pd53ak7n8tgeqr46w, code id 925 per the SCRT Labs v1.10 proposal) is the only documented liquidation backstop: pooled SILK repays liquidated debt and depositors receive the seized collateral at the vault discount. Its get_pool_info compute query at block 26592283 reported total_silk_deposited of 88,291.3 SILK (epoch 2) against 207,123.4 SILK of aggregate elastic ShadeLend debt across both registries. No insurance fund, protocol bad-debt buyer, or external liquidation backstop is documented in the reviewed sources.
No alternate oracle provider exists: Shade's tech-stack documentation lists Band Protocol as the live oracle with SupraOracles still under research, and the Oracle Router holds a single default provider (Band Standard Reference Proxy secret1ezamax2vrhjpy92fnujlpwfj2dpredaafss47k). The router's protected-key deviation guard list was empty at block 26592283, so no deviation clamp is currently enforced; an OraclesAdmin can freeze the router via Admin Auth. The Silk Index Oracle (when_stale 3600s) freezes the SILK peg at its last computed value when feeds go stale or its deviation threshold is exceeded, and requires an admin rollback to unfreeze. Vault collateral pricing enforces a per-vault collateral_oracle_delay staleness tolerance (600s on all current vaults except the frozen WBTC vault, where it is disabled at 99,999,999,999,999s); the Overseer's silk_oracle_delay for the SILK Peg leg is 21,600s. Band heartbeat for this Secret Network deployment is not published; all Band-backed keys returned sub-minute-fresh updates at the observation time.
No global shutdown, settlement, write-off, or bad-debt socialization path is documented in the reviewed sources (Shade docs, hackathon reference, shade-oracle source). The observed containment lever is per-vault governance freeze: the registry reports vault status (normal / frozen / deprecated), and frozen vaults block new borrowing while existing debt remains. Behavior when the Stability Pool holds insufficient SILK to cover a liquidation is not published. On-chain precedent at block 26592283: the frozen WBTC vault carries 37,867.7 SILK of elastic debt against near-zero remaining collateral (collateral elastic 2,097 raw units, about 0.00002097 WBTC) and its LiquidatablePositions query reverts with a divide-by-zero error, so that shortfall currently sits stranded and unsocialized.
ShadeLend vault 13: INJ
INJ (vault 13) · max LTV 70% · Observed 2026-08-08 at Secret Network block 26592283 by encrypted compute query (secretjs, Lavender.Five LCD gateway) against the Shade Single Vault Registry secret1qxk2scacpgj2mmm0af60674afl9e6qneg7yuny (code hash ac5d501827d9a337a618ca493fcbf1323b20771378774a6bf466cb66361bf021, matching the Shade hackathon reference's current-registry hash). Collateral token secret14706vxakdzkz9a36872cs62vpl5qd84kpwvpew. max_ltv 0.70, liquidation discount 10%, borrow fee 0%, interest rate 5% (target), collateral_oracle_delay 600s, status "normal", 7 open positions, elastic debt 0.0 SILK at block 26592283. Per-position debt and collateral amounts are private Secret Network state (registry returns zeroed position amounts); per-position LTV is exposed only for liquidatable positions.
Permissionless stability-pool liquidation: anyone can query LiquidatablePositions { vault_id } on the vault registry and execute Liquidate { vault_id, position_id } (Shade hackathon reference). The Shade Stability Pool automatically supplies SILK to repay half of the position's outstanding debt; collateral backing the loan is seized at this vault's 10% liquidation discount and distributed to Stability Pool depositors, the liquidation caller receives 10% of liquidation profits, and a 20% protocol share goes to the Shade treasury (per-vault liquidation_fee config read from the registry). No auction window or liquidation delay is documented; execution is atomic in the calling transaction. · liquidation delay None
The Shade Stability Pool (secret1wdxqz26acf2e6rsac8007pd53ak7n8tgeqr46w, code id 925 per the SCRT Labs v1.10 proposal) is the only documented liquidation backstop: pooled SILK repays liquidated debt and depositors receive the seized collateral at the vault discount. Its get_pool_info compute query at block 26592283 reported total_silk_deposited of 88,291.3 SILK (epoch 2) against 207,123.4 SILK of aggregate elastic ShadeLend debt across both registries. No insurance fund, protocol bad-debt buyer, or external liquidation backstop is documented in the reviewed sources.
No alternate oracle provider exists: Shade's tech-stack documentation lists Band Protocol as the live oracle with SupraOracles still under research, and the Oracle Router holds a single default provider (Band Standard Reference Proxy secret1ezamax2vrhjpy92fnujlpwfj2dpredaafss47k). The router's protected-key deviation guard list was empty at block 26592283, so no deviation clamp is currently enforced; an OraclesAdmin can freeze the router via Admin Auth. The Silk Index Oracle (when_stale 3600s) freezes the SILK peg at its last computed value when feeds go stale or its deviation threshold is exceeded, and requires an admin rollback to unfreeze. Vault collateral pricing enforces a per-vault collateral_oracle_delay staleness tolerance (600s on all current vaults except the frozen WBTC vault, where it is disabled at 99,999,999,999,999s); the Overseer's silk_oracle_delay for the SILK Peg leg is 21,600s. Band heartbeat for this Secret Network deployment is not published; all Band-backed keys returned sub-minute-fresh updates at the observation time.
No global shutdown, settlement, write-off, or bad-debt socialization path is documented in the reviewed sources (Shade docs, hackathon reference, shade-oracle source). The observed containment lever is per-vault governance freeze: the registry reports vault status (normal / frozen / deprecated), and frozen vaults block new borrowing while existing debt remains. Behavior when the Stability Pool holds insufficient SILK to cover a liquidation is not published. On-chain precedent at block 26592283: the frozen WBTC vault carries 37,867.7 SILK of elastic debt against near-zero remaining collateral (collateral elastic 2,097 raw units, about 0.00002097 WBTC) and its LiquidatablePositions query reverts with a divide-by-zero error, so that shortfall currently sits stranded and unsocialized.
ShadeLend vault 14: Stride stINJ
Stride stINJ (vault 14) · max LTV 60% · Observed 2026-08-08 at Secret Network block 26592283 by encrypted compute query (secretjs, Lavender.Five LCD gateway) against the Shade Single Vault Registry secret1qxk2scacpgj2mmm0af60674afl9e6qneg7yuny (code hash ac5d501827d9a337a618ca493fcbf1323b20771378774a6bf466cb66361bf021, matching the Shade hackathon reference's current-registry hash). Collateral token secret1eurddal3m0tphtapad9awgzcuxwz8ptrdx7h4n. max_ltv 0.60, liquidation discount 10%, borrow fee 0%, interest rate 5% (target), collateral_oracle_delay 600s, status "normal", 18 open positions, elastic debt 0.0 SILK at block 26592283. Per-position debt and collateral amounts are private Secret Network state (registry returns zeroed position amounts); per-position LTV is exposed only for liquidatable positions.
Permissionless stability-pool liquidation: anyone can query LiquidatablePositions { vault_id } on the vault registry and execute Liquidate { vault_id, position_id } (Shade hackathon reference). The Shade Stability Pool automatically supplies SILK to repay half of the position's outstanding debt; collateral backing the loan is seized at this vault's 10% liquidation discount and distributed to Stability Pool depositors, the liquidation caller receives 10% of liquidation profits, and a 20% protocol share goes to the Shade treasury (per-vault liquidation_fee config read from the registry). No auction window or liquidation delay is documented; execution is atomic in the calling transaction. · liquidation delay None
The Shade Stability Pool (secret1wdxqz26acf2e6rsac8007pd53ak7n8tgeqr46w, code id 925 per the SCRT Labs v1.10 proposal) is the only documented liquidation backstop: pooled SILK repays liquidated debt and depositors receive the seized collateral at the vault discount. Its get_pool_info compute query at block 26592283 reported total_silk_deposited of 88,291.3 SILK (epoch 2) against 207,123.4 SILK of aggregate elastic ShadeLend debt across both registries. No insurance fund, protocol bad-debt buyer, or external liquidation backstop is documented in the reviewed sources.
No alternate oracle provider exists: Shade's tech-stack documentation lists Band Protocol as the live oracle with SupraOracles still under research, and the Oracle Router holds a single default provider (Band Standard Reference Proxy secret1ezamax2vrhjpy92fnujlpwfj2dpredaafss47k). The router's protected-key deviation guard list was empty at block 26592283, so no deviation clamp is currently enforced; an OraclesAdmin can freeze the router via Admin Auth. The Silk Index Oracle (when_stale 3600s) freezes the SILK peg at its last computed value when feeds go stale or its deviation threshold is exceeded, and requires an admin rollback to unfreeze. Vault collateral pricing enforces a per-vault collateral_oracle_delay staleness tolerance (600s on all current vaults except the frozen WBTC vault, where it is disabled at 99,999,999,999,999s); the Overseer's silk_oracle_delay for the SILK Peg leg is 21,600s. Band heartbeat for this Secret Network deployment is not published; all Band-backed keys returned sub-minute-fresh updates at the observation time.
No global shutdown, settlement, write-off, or bad-debt socialization path is documented in the reviewed sources (Shade docs, hackathon reference, shade-oracle source). The observed containment lever is per-vault governance freeze: the registry reports vault status (normal / frozen / deprecated), and frozen vaults block new borrowing while existing debt remains. Behavior when the Stability Pool holds insufficient SILK to cover a liquidation is not published. On-chain precedent at block 26592283: the frozen WBTC vault carries 37,867.7 SILK of elastic debt against near-zero remaining collateral (collateral elastic 2,097 raw units, about 0.00002097 WBTC) and its LiquidatablePositions query reverts with a divide-by-zero error, so that shortfall currently sits stranded and unsocialized.
Legacy ShadeLend vault 1: stkd-SCRT (deprecated)
stkd-SCRT (legacy vault 1) · max LTV 45% · Observed 2026-08-08 at Secret Network block 26592283 by encrypted compute query against the Single Vault Registry Legacy secret18y86hldtdp9ndj0jekcch49kwr0gwy7upe3ffw (code hash 148a525ec7bffedfc41cbc5339bf22d9e310d49b65831a269c86774fb732948c, matching the hackathon reference's minting-closed registry); legacy vaults remain liquidatable. Collateral token secret1k6u0cy4feepm6pehnz804zmwakuwdapm69tuc4. max_ltv 0.45, liquidation discount 10%, borrow fee 0%, interest rate 5% (target), collateral_oracle_delay 600s, status "deprecated", 27 open positions, elastic debt 169.3 SILK at block 26592283. Per-position debt and collateral amounts are private Secret Network state (registry returns zeroed position amounts); per-position LTV is exposed only for liquidatable positions.
Permissionless stability-pool liquidation: anyone can query LiquidatablePositions { vault_id } on the vault registry and execute Liquidate { vault_id, position_id } (Shade hackathon reference). The Shade Stability Pool automatically supplies SILK to repay half of the position's outstanding debt; collateral backing the loan is seized at this vault's 10% liquidation discount and distributed to Stability Pool depositors, the liquidation caller receives 10% of liquidation profits, and a 20% protocol share goes to the Shade treasury (per-vault liquidation_fee config read from the registry). No auction window or liquidation delay is documented; execution is atomic in the calling transaction. · liquidation delay None
The Shade Stability Pool (secret1wdxqz26acf2e6rsac8007pd53ak7n8tgeqr46w, code id 925 per the SCRT Labs v1.10 proposal) is the only documented liquidation backstop: pooled SILK repays liquidated debt and depositors receive the seized collateral at the vault discount. Its get_pool_info compute query at block 26592283 reported total_silk_deposited of 88,291.3 SILK (epoch 2) against 207,123.4 SILK of aggregate elastic ShadeLend debt across both registries. No insurance fund, protocol bad-debt buyer, or external liquidation backstop is documented in the reviewed sources.
No alternate oracle provider exists: Shade's tech-stack documentation lists Band Protocol as the live oracle with SupraOracles still under research, and the Oracle Router holds a single default provider (Band Standard Reference Proxy secret1ezamax2vrhjpy92fnujlpwfj2dpredaafss47k). The router's protected-key deviation guard list was empty at block 26592283, so no deviation clamp is currently enforced; an OraclesAdmin can freeze the router via Admin Auth. The Silk Index Oracle (when_stale 3600s) freezes the SILK peg at its last computed value when feeds go stale or its deviation threshold is exceeded, and requires an admin rollback to unfreeze. Vault collateral pricing enforces a per-vault collateral_oracle_delay staleness tolerance (600s on all current vaults except the frozen WBTC vault, where it is disabled at 99,999,999,999,999s); the Overseer's silk_oracle_delay for the SILK Peg leg is 21,600s. Band heartbeat for this Secret Network deployment is not published; all Band-backed keys returned sub-minute-fresh updates at the observation time.
No global shutdown, settlement, write-off, or bad-debt socialization path is documented in the reviewed sources (Shade docs, hackathon reference, shade-oracle source). The observed containment lever is per-vault governance freeze: the registry reports vault status (normal / frozen / deprecated), and frozen vaults block new borrowing while existing debt remains. Behavior when the Stability Pool holds insufficient SILK to cover a liquidation is not published. On-chain precedent at block 26592283: the frozen WBTC vault carries 37,867.7 SILK of elastic debt against near-zero remaining collateral (collateral elastic 2,097 raw units, about 0.00002097 WBTC) and its LiquidatablePositions query reverts with a divide-by-zero error, so that shortfall currently sits stranded and unsocialized.
Legacy ShadeLend vault 3: USDC (deprecated)
USDC (legacy vault 3) · max LTV 85% · Observed 2026-08-08 at Secret Network block 26592283 by encrypted compute query against the Single Vault Registry Legacy secret18y86hldtdp9ndj0jekcch49kwr0gwy7upe3ffw (code hash 148a525ec7bffedfc41cbc5339bf22d9e310d49b65831a269c86774fb732948c, matching the hackathon reference's minting-closed registry); legacy vaults remain liquidatable. Collateral token secret1vkq022x4q8t8kx9de3r84u669l65xnwf2lg3e6. max_ltv 0.85, liquidation discount 5%, borrow fee 0%, interest rate 5% (target), collateral_oracle_delay 600s, status "deprecated", 8 open positions, elastic debt 0.1 SILK at block 26592283. Per-position debt and collateral amounts are private Secret Network state (registry returns zeroed position amounts); per-position LTV is exposed only for liquidatable positions.
Permissionless stability-pool liquidation: anyone can query LiquidatablePositions { vault_id } on the vault registry and execute Liquidate { vault_id, position_id } (Shade hackathon reference). The Shade Stability Pool automatically supplies SILK to repay half of the position's outstanding debt; collateral backing the loan is seized at this vault's 5% liquidation discount and distributed to Stability Pool depositors, the liquidation caller receives 10% of liquidation profits, and a 20% protocol share goes to the Shade treasury (per-vault liquidation_fee config read from the registry). No auction window or liquidation delay is documented; execution is atomic in the calling transaction. · liquidation delay None
The Shade Stability Pool (secret1wdxqz26acf2e6rsac8007pd53ak7n8tgeqr46w, code id 925 per the SCRT Labs v1.10 proposal) is the only documented liquidation backstop: pooled SILK repays liquidated debt and depositors receive the seized collateral at the vault discount. Its get_pool_info compute query at block 26592283 reported total_silk_deposited of 88,291.3 SILK (epoch 2) against 207,123.4 SILK of aggregate elastic ShadeLend debt across both registries. No insurance fund, protocol bad-debt buyer, or external liquidation backstop is documented in the reviewed sources.
No alternate oracle provider exists: Shade's tech-stack documentation lists Band Protocol as the live oracle with SupraOracles still under research, and the Oracle Router holds a single default provider (Band Standard Reference Proxy secret1ezamax2vrhjpy92fnujlpwfj2dpredaafss47k). The router's protected-key deviation guard list was empty at block 26592283, so no deviation clamp is currently enforced; an OraclesAdmin can freeze the router via Admin Auth. The Silk Index Oracle (when_stale 3600s) freezes the SILK peg at its last computed value when feeds go stale or its deviation threshold is exceeded, and requires an admin rollback to unfreeze. Vault collateral pricing enforces a per-vault collateral_oracle_delay staleness tolerance (600s on all current vaults except the frozen WBTC vault, where it is disabled at 99,999,999,999,999s); the Overseer's silk_oracle_delay for the SILK Peg leg is 21,600s. Band heartbeat for this Secret Network deployment is not published; all Band-backed keys returned sub-minute-fresh updates at the observation time.
No global shutdown, settlement, write-off, or bad-debt socialization path is documented in the reviewed sources (Shade docs, hackathon reference, shade-oracle source). The observed containment lever is per-vault governance freeze: the registry reports vault status (normal / frozen / deprecated), and frozen vaults block new borrowing while existing debt remains. Behavior when the Stability Pool holds insufficient SILK to cover a liquidation is not published. On-chain precedent at block 26592283: the frozen WBTC vault carries 37,867.7 SILK of elastic debt against near-zero remaining collateral (collateral elastic 2,097 raw units, about 0.00002097 WBTC) and its LiquidatablePositions query reverts with a divide-by-zero error, so that shortfall currently sits stranded and unsocialized.
Legacy ShadeLend vault 4: Stride stATOM (deprecated)
Stride stATOM (legacy vault 4) · max LTV 45% · Observed 2026-08-08 at Secret Network block 26592283 by encrypted compute query against the Single Vault Registry Legacy secret18y86hldtdp9ndj0jekcch49kwr0gwy7upe3ffw (code hash 148a525ec7bffedfc41cbc5339bf22d9e310d49b65831a269c86774fb732948c, matching the hackathon reference's minting-closed registry); legacy vaults remain liquidatable. Collateral token secret155w9uxruypsltvqfygh5urghd5v0zc6f9g69sq. max_ltv 0.45, liquidation discount 10%, borrow fee 0%, interest rate 5% (target), collateral_oracle_delay 600s, status "deprecated", 13 open positions, elastic debt 12.2 SILK at block 26592283. Per-position debt and collateral amounts are private Secret Network state (registry returns zeroed position amounts); per-position LTV is exposed only for liquidatable positions.
Permissionless stability-pool liquidation: anyone can query LiquidatablePositions { vault_id } on the vault registry and execute Liquidate { vault_id, position_id } (Shade hackathon reference). The Shade Stability Pool automatically supplies SILK to repay half of the position's outstanding debt; collateral backing the loan is seized at this vault's 10% liquidation discount and distributed to Stability Pool depositors, the liquidation caller receives 10% of liquidation profits, and a 20% protocol share goes to the Shade treasury (per-vault liquidation_fee config read from the registry). No auction window or liquidation delay is documented; execution is atomic in the calling transaction. · liquidation delay None
The Shade Stability Pool (secret1wdxqz26acf2e6rsac8007pd53ak7n8tgeqr46w, code id 925 per the SCRT Labs v1.10 proposal) is the only documented liquidation backstop: pooled SILK repays liquidated debt and depositors receive the seized collateral at the vault discount. Its get_pool_info compute query at block 26592283 reported total_silk_deposited of 88,291.3 SILK (epoch 2) against 207,123.4 SILK of aggregate elastic ShadeLend debt across both registries. No insurance fund, protocol bad-debt buyer, or external liquidation backstop is documented in the reviewed sources.
No alternate oracle provider exists: Shade's tech-stack documentation lists Band Protocol as the live oracle with SupraOracles still under research, and the Oracle Router holds a single default provider (Band Standard Reference Proxy secret1ezamax2vrhjpy92fnujlpwfj2dpredaafss47k). The router's protected-key deviation guard list was empty at block 26592283, so no deviation clamp is currently enforced; an OraclesAdmin can freeze the router via Admin Auth. The Silk Index Oracle (when_stale 3600s) freezes the SILK peg at its last computed value when feeds go stale or its deviation threshold is exceeded, and requires an admin rollback to unfreeze. Vault collateral pricing enforces a per-vault collateral_oracle_delay staleness tolerance (600s on all current vaults except the frozen WBTC vault, where it is disabled at 99,999,999,999,999s); the Overseer's silk_oracle_delay for the SILK Peg leg is 21,600s. Band heartbeat for this Secret Network deployment is not published; all Band-backed keys returned sub-minute-fresh updates at the observation time.
No global shutdown, settlement, write-off, or bad-debt socialization path is documented in the reviewed sources (Shade docs, hackathon reference, shade-oracle source). The observed containment lever is per-vault governance freeze: the registry reports vault status (normal / frozen / deprecated), and frozen vaults block new borrowing while existing debt remains. Behavior when the Stability Pool holds insufficient SILK to cover a liquidation is not published. On-chain precedent at block 26592283: the frozen WBTC vault carries 37,867.7 SILK of elastic debt against near-zero remaining collateral (collateral elastic 2,097 raw units, about 0.00002097 WBTC) and its LiquidatablePositions query reverts with a divide-by-zero error, so that shortfall currently sits stranded and unsocialized.
Legacy ShadeLend vault 5: Stride stOSMO (deprecated)
Stride stOSMO (legacy vault 5) · max LTV 45% · Observed 2026-08-08 at Secret Network block 26592283 by encrypted compute query against the Single Vault Registry Legacy secret18y86hldtdp9ndj0jekcch49kwr0gwy7upe3ffw (code hash 148a525ec7bffedfc41cbc5339bf22d9e310d49b65831a269c86774fb732948c, matching the hackathon reference's minting-closed registry); legacy vaults remain liquidatable. Collateral token secret1jrp6z8v679yaq65rndsr970mhaxzgfkymvc58g. max_ltv 0.45, liquidation discount 10%, borrow fee 0%, interest rate 5% (target), collateral_oracle_delay 600s, status "deprecated", 5 open positions, elastic debt 0.7 SILK at block 26592283. Per-position debt and collateral amounts are private Secret Network state (registry returns zeroed position amounts); per-position LTV is exposed only for liquidatable positions.
Permissionless stability-pool liquidation: anyone can query LiquidatablePositions { vault_id } on the vault registry and execute Liquidate { vault_id, position_id } (Shade hackathon reference). The Shade Stability Pool automatically supplies SILK to repay half of the position's outstanding debt; collateral backing the loan is seized at this vault's 10% liquidation discount and distributed to Stability Pool depositors, the liquidation caller receives 10% of liquidation profits, and a 20% protocol share goes to the Shade treasury (per-vault liquidation_fee config read from the registry). No auction window or liquidation delay is documented; execution is atomic in the calling transaction. · liquidation delay None
The Shade Stability Pool (secret1wdxqz26acf2e6rsac8007pd53ak7n8tgeqr46w, code id 925 per the SCRT Labs v1.10 proposal) is the only documented liquidation backstop: pooled SILK repays liquidated debt and depositors receive the seized collateral at the vault discount. Its get_pool_info compute query at block 26592283 reported total_silk_deposited of 88,291.3 SILK (epoch 2) against 207,123.4 SILK of aggregate elastic ShadeLend debt across both registries. No insurance fund, protocol bad-debt buyer, or external liquidation backstop is documented in the reviewed sources.
No alternate oracle provider exists: Shade's tech-stack documentation lists Band Protocol as the live oracle with SupraOracles still under research, and the Oracle Router holds a single default provider (Band Standard Reference Proxy secret1ezamax2vrhjpy92fnujlpwfj2dpredaafss47k). The router's protected-key deviation guard list was empty at block 26592283, so no deviation clamp is currently enforced; an OraclesAdmin can freeze the router via Admin Auth. The Silk Index Oracle (when_stale 3600s) freezes the SILK peg at its last computed value when feeds go stale or its deviation threshold is exceeded, and requires an admin rollback to unfreeze. Vault collateral pricing enforces a per-vault collateral_oracle_delay staleness tolerance (600s on all current vaults except the frozen WBTC vault, where it is disabled at 99,999,999,999,999s); the Overseer's silk_oracle_delay for the SILK Peg leg is 21,600s. Band heartbeat for this Secret Network deployment is not published; all Band-backed keys returned sub-minute-fresh updates at the observation time.
No global shutdown, settlement, write-off, or bad-debt socialization path is documented in the reviewed sources (Shade docs, hackathon reference, shade-oracle source). The observed containment lever is per-vault governance freeze: the registry reports vault status (normal / frozen / deprecated), and frozen vaults block new borrowing while existing debt remains. Behavior when the Stability Pool holds insufficient SILK to cover a liquidation is not published. On-chain precedent at block 26592283: the frozen WBTC vault carries 37,867.7 SILK of elastic debt against near-zero remaining collateral (collateral elastic 2,097 raw units, about 0.00002097 WBTC) and its LiquidatablePositions query reverts with a divide-by-zero error, so that shortfall currently sits stranded and unsocialized.
